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Propertisation & Commercialisation: On Controlling 
the Uses of Human Biomaterials 
 
Abstract 
Until recently the one person who was not deemed to have property rights 
in biomaterials was the source of those materials. Third parties, such as 
researchers and biotech companies, can and do legally acquire property 
rights in these materials. They are, thus, protected by the law of property in 
their use of these. Recent legal cases, however, have seen a move away 
from this general position towards the tentative recognition of some 
property rights in biomaterials which vest in the source. Thus far, however, 
this recognition has not included any income rights. These developments 
prompt a re-examination of the application of property rights to 
biomaterials. In this article, I identify two issues which seem particularly 
pertinent: the interests that parties have in controlling the uses of 
biomaterials and the commercial interests that stem from those uses. I 
contend that concerns regarding the allocation of property rights to the 
source generally elide property rights in biomaterials with the right to 
derive income from the transfer of those materials. Objections to 
commercialisation need to be distinguished from objections to property. If 
this is done, then it becomes clear that propertisation does not analytically 
entail commercialisation. This argument notwithstanding, biotechnological 
advances have transformed the value of human biomaterials along 
numerous dimensions, including in commercial terms. Yet while 
researchers and biotech companies can sell tissues and cells, the practical 
effect of the current legal framework is that the source of those materials 
cannot. I, therefore, question whether, it is reasonable to protect third 
parties (such as researchers and biotechnology companies) with regards to 
income rights, while excluding the very source of the biomaterials. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12086  
 
 Introduction 
When we say that a resource falls within the domain governed by property 
relations we are acknowledging a particular way of controlling that 
resource. This recognition consequently brings such resources within the 
purview and protections of existing property institutions. Those who argue 
that persons should be seen as having property in their separated 
biomaterials think that individuals ought to have this type of control therein, 
as well as any consequent protections in their exercise of that control. One 
set of responses to this takes the form of moral objections to the 
commercialisation and commodification of organs and tissues. Yet such 
objections do not go hand in hand with opposition to the donation of those 
self-same materials even though donation arguably involves exercising 
those rights of use and control that are characteristic of property. In this 
article I examine conflicts which have arisen with regards to biomaterials in 
order to illuminate the association between property and control and that 
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which is presumed to exist between property and sale. While it can be 
difficult to disentangle property from market transactions, objections to 
commercialisation need to be distinguished from objections to property per 
se. Drawing on the work of John Christman, J.W. Harris, and James Penner, 
I argue that objections to property in biomaterials generally conflate powers 
of control, which may include the power to transfer, with the right to derive 
income from such transfers. Recognising this allows us to admit property in 
bodily materials, and thus the accompanying protections and control, 
without necessarily having to permit the source to trade their biomaterials 
on the market. Nevertheless, as we will see, a market in tissue commodities 
already exists. Given this I question the selective moral disquiet that exists 
regarding the effect of the commercialisation of human biomaterials by 
their source. 
 
Property & biovalue in human biomaterials 
Advancing biotechnology has fundamentally altered the way we view the 
human body and its parts and products. We have moved from being simply 
the end-users of medicine and research to each of us being a potential 
purveyor of it. This is due, as Margaret Brazier argues, to ‘the diverse 
means by which we ourselves may be used as medicine’1. Human biological 
materials can be used to treat illness and disease.2 These include blood and 
blood products for transfusions, organs for transplantation, and gametes and 
embryos for in vitro fertilisation (IVF) and pre-implantation genetic 
diagnosis (PGD). PGD coupled with Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) 
typing literally allows us to create a child whose umbilical cord blood can 
be life-saving for their brother or sister. Stem cells represent another avenue 
of potentially life-altering, if not life-saving, human medicine, and may 
yield treatments for a huge variety of diseases. There is a burgeoning new 
class of products which draw on tissue-engineering expertise, combining 
human biomaterials with artificial scaffolds; for example, cartilage for 
repairing joints,3 bladders grown from patient’s own cells,4 and biohybrid 
                                                 
*** I would like to thank Roger Brownsword, Sara Fovargue, Imogen Goold, Suzanne Ost, 
Nicolette Priaulx, Jesse Wall, and the two anonymous reviewers for their comments on 
earlier drafts of this article. I would also like to thank those at the SCRIPT Conference: 
Law and Transformation 2012, the Society of Legal Scholars 2012 Conference, and 
Translational Bodies: Ethical, Legal and Social Issues Conference 2014 who have given 
me invaluable comments on it.  
1
 M. Brazier, ‘Human(s) as Medicine(s)’ in S. Mclean (ed.), First Do No Harm (Aldershot: 
Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2006), 188. 
2
 For a comprehensive overview of the use of human biomaterials see Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics, Human Bodies: Donation for Medicine and Research (Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics, 2011), chapter 1. 
3
 T. Simonite, ‘Lab-grown Cartilage Fixes Damaged Knees’ New Scientist  5th July 2006, 
available at http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn9483-labgrown-cartilage-fixes-
damaged-knees.html, , last accessed 11th April 2014. 
4
 R. Khamsi , ‘Bio-engineered Bladders Successful in Patients’ New Scientist  4th April 
2006, available at http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn8939-bioengineered-bladders-
successful-in-patients.html, last accessed 11th April 2014. 
Quigley, M. ‘Propertisation and Commercialisation: On Controlling the 
Uses of Human Biomaterials’ (2014) 77(5) MLR 677–702 
3 
tracheas for transplantation.5 Furthermore, there are less media-worthy and 
exciting uses of human biomaterials, such as those used in research into the 
aetiology, pathology, and treatment of disease. Cells and tissues are also 
used for basic medical research which is not yet near clinical application. 
Brazier has called these diverse uses of persons and their bodies the ‘notion 
of humans as medicines.’6   
Significant drivers of this ‘humans as medicines’ enterprise are the 
commercial and quasi-commercial activities of medicine, scientists, 
pharmaceutical companies, and other industry actors.7 The evolving, ever 
increasing, and different uses of human biological materials come hand in 
hand with a change in the values that attach to organs, tissues, cells, and 
even the whole body. These values range from the emotional to the 
scientific and public to private; importantly these include value in 
biomaterials as objects of commerce.8 This business side to what is 
ostensibly a medical endeavour has been termed the ‘tissue economy’.9 The 
phrase itself perhaps tells us more about the changing face of biomedicine 
than the most comprehensive of lists of the uses and applications of human 
biomaterials. Nils Hoppe uses the word ‘bioequity’ in talking about 
property in human biomaterials.10 This phrase is used idiosyncratically in 
his proposal for the application of the law of equity to biomaterials in order 
to create a new property class.11 However, it also brings to mind equity in 
terms more usual to the financial sector; that is, bioequity as denoting the 
latent value that lies in our bodies and their tissues and cells. In relation to 
organ and tissue donation David Price has argued that ‘[t]his ‘value’ 
enhances the vulnerability and prospectability of our bodies and the need 
for donor, and indeed often community, interests to be properly protected.’12  
Such vulnerability and prospectability is evident in the legal market in 
human body parts (as well as through a very lucrative illegal market which 
operates in tandem with, and sometimes blurs into, the legal one).13 Certain 
                                                 
5
 A. Coghlan, ‘Man Receives World's First Synthetic Windpipe’ New Scientist  8th July 
2011, available at http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn20671-man-receives-worlds-first-
synthetic-windpipe.html, last accessed 11th April 2014. 
6
 Brazier, n 1 above. 
7
 M. Quigley, ‘Property and the body: Applying Honoré’ (2007) 33 J Med Ethics 631. 
8
 J.K. Mason and G.T. Laurie, ‘Consent or Property? Dealing with the Body and its Parts 
in the Shadow of Bristol 
and Alder Hey’ (2001) 64 MLR 710, 712-3. 
9
 See C. Waldby and R. Mitchell, Tissue Economies: Blood, Organs and Cell Lines in Late 
Capitalism (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2006), 31-4. See also A. 
Webster, ‘Stem Cell Research and Society: Lessons from Social Science’ 2008. Available 
at http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_38010.asp. Last accessed 11th April 2014. 
10
 N. Hoppe, Bioequity - Property and the Human Body (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 
2009), 138. 
11
 Ibid. chapters 11 and 12. 
12
 D. Price, Human Tissue in Transplantation and Research (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 3. 
13
 See for example the story of the theft of Alastair Cooke’s thigh bones which were 
reportedly stolen sold to a dental implant company for $7,000 -  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/4552742.stm. Last accessed 11th April 2014. Further see a list 
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tissues and cells are not subject to the restrictions on sale which, for 
example, govern human organs for transplantation. This is because material 
removed outwith transplant purposes is not captured by the Human Tissue 
Act 2004 provisions on the prohibition on commercial dealings. Even then 
it exempts from the prohibition material which is the subject of property 
because of an ‘application of human skill’,14  as well as those which have 
been created outside the body such as cell lines.15 The result is that some 
biomaterials can be legally traded and contribute to a flourishing and 
lucrative global market.16 In making this observation, it should be noted that 
tissue handling and processing is an institutionalised activity; that is, it 
takes place in certain well-demarcated domains where those using cells and 
tissues have the requisite skills and resources. Furthermore, it only 
(legitimately) occurs where those involved can meet the necessary legal 
requirements; for example, compliance with European legislation and the 
licensing requirements of the Human Tissue Authority.17 The practical 
effect of this is that researchers and biotech companies can sell tissues and 
cells, but the very source of those biomaterials (you and I) cannot.18 It is this 
value transformation due to commercial and quasi-commercial uses, along 
with recent legal developments, which makes apposite a re-analysis of the 
notion of property as applied to human biomaterials.   
 
 Human biomaterials, property, & the law 
There is no doubt that human biomaterials are seen as capable of being 
legitimate objects of property in the eyes of the law. Although previously 
governed by the ‘no property’ rule,19 this approach to human tissue has been 
                                                                                                                                                   
of the worth of black market body parts in A. Cheney, Body Brokers: Inside America's 
Underground Trade in Human Remains (Broadway Books, 2006), xv. 
14
 s. 32(9)(c). 
15
 s. 54(7) and Explanatory Notes, s. 10. See also the HTA’s supplementary list which 
outlines materials which do and do not fall within the remit of the Act. Available at 
http://www.hta.gov.uk/_db/_documents/Supplementary_list_of_materials_200811252407.
pdf. Last accessed 11th April 2014. 
16
 Although difficult to estimate the worth of the global industry due to the diverse and 
multiple uses of biomaterials, looking at individual sectors can give us an idea of its scale. 
For example, regarding cell therapies, Mason et al. estimate that there is now an annual 
turnover in excess of $1 billion dollars. See C. Mason, D.A. Brindley, E.J. Culme-
Seymour, & N.L. Davie, ‘Cell Therapy Industry: Billion Dollar Global Business with 
Unlimited Potential’ (2011) 6 Regen Med 265, 266. 
17
 See, for example, the HTA guidance on ‘Licensing under the Quality and Safety 
Regulations’ (available at 
http://www.hta.gov.uk/licensingandinspections/licensingunderthequalityandsafetyregulatio
ns.cfm, last accessed 11th April 2014). This is wider than the scope of the European Union 
Tissue and Cells Directives (2004/23/EC, 2006/17/EC, and 2006/86/EC). 
18
 It is presumably conceivable that an individual possessing the right resources and skill 
set could process their own cells and tissues in the requisite manner required for the 
exception to apply. However, besides this being a tall pragmatic ask, it is also unlikely that 
the would-be home researcher would be able to meet the other legal requirements in terms 
of safety and licensing. 
19
 See E. Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England: Concerning High 
Treason, and Other Pleas of the Crown, and Criminal Causes (London 1669), 203 (3 Co. 
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superseded by rulings in case law (in England and Wales and beyond) 
which take into account a variety of considerations.20 Amongst these are 
rulings which permit property rights in human tissue for a variety of 
purposes and legal ends,21 including ‘to facilitate prosecutions in theft, to 
establish legitimate entitlements to possess tissue samples for research and 
other ends, as a means to permitting remedial action and compensation for 
damage done, and, most recently, in order to permit possession of sperm for 
the purposes of in-vitro fertilisation.’22 A significant part of the impetus for 
including the body and biomaterials within the purview of property is the 
legal difficulties which arise when they are excluded from it. Such obstacles 
are evident when we look at some of the early cases which adhered to the 
‘no property’ rule. Take, for example, R v Lynn (1788)23 and R v Sharpe 
(1857)24. In the first of these Lynn was a resurrectionist who disinterred a 
corpse for dissection and the charge of digging up a corpse was brought 
against him. A similar charge was brought against Sharpe in the latter case 
where the defendant disinterred the corpse of his mother in order that it be 
buried with that of his recently deceased father. The difficulty arises 
because, as Kenyon Mason and Graeme Laurie note, ‘the definition of theft, 
or larceny as it was at the relevant time, involves the appropriation of 
‘property belonging to another’. If there is no property, there can be no 
theft.’25 In both cases other charges were brought out of necessity. The 
judge in Lynn, while recognising that ‘carrying away a dead body was not 
criminal’,26 nonetheless, claimed that such practices were indecent and 
contra bonos mores (against good morals).27 The defendants in both cases 
were convicted of misdemeanours (of disinterring a body for dissection in 
                                                                                                                                                   
Inst. 203). See also the Haynes’ Case (1614) 77 ER 1389. Later cases incorporating the 
rule include R v Lynn (1788) 2 T R 394, R v Sharpe (1857) 169 ER 959, Foster v Dodd 
(1866) LQ 1 QB 475, (1867) LR 3 QB 67, R v Price (1884) 12 QBD 247, and Williams v 
Williams (1881-85) All ER 840. Although the origins of the rule are uncertain and 
contestable. See P. Matthews, ‘The Man of Property’ (1995) 3 Med Law Rev 251-74 and 
‘Whose Body? People as Property’ (1983) 36 Current Legal Problems 193-239. 
20
 M. Quigley, ‘Property in Human Biomaterials: Separating Persons and Things?’ (2012)  
32 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 659, 660-666. 
21
J.K. Mason and G.T Laurie, Mason and McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics, 9th 
Edition (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 476. 
22
 Quigley, n 20 above, 661. For some relevant cases see R v Herbert (1961) 25 JCL 163; R 
v Welsh (1974) RTR 478; R v Rothery [1976] RTR 550; (1976) 63 Cr App R 231; R v 
Kelly and Lindsay [1998] 3 All ER 741; Doodeward v Spence 6 CLR 406; AB and Others 
v Leeds Teaching Hospital NHS Trust EWHC 644; Moore v Regents of the University of 
California 51 Cal.3d 120, Greenberg v Miami Children’s Hospital Research Institute 264 
F.Sup2d 1064 (SD Fla, 2003); Washington University v William J. Catalona 490 F.3d 667; 
Jonathan Yearworth and Others v. North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 37;  Bazley 
v Wesley Monash IVF Pty Ltd [2010] QSC 118; Jocelyn Edwards; Re the estate of the late 
Mark Edwards [2011] NSWSC 478; and Re H, AE No 2, [2012] SASC 177, (No 3) [2013] 
SASC 196. 
23
 2 T R 394.  
24
 Dears. and Bell 159. 
25
 J.K. Mason and G.T. Laurie ‘Consent or Property? Dealing with the Body and its Parts 
in the Shadow of Bristol and Alder Hey’ MLR 64 (2001) 710, 714. 
26
 R v Lynn (1788) 2 TR 732, 734. 
27
 Ibid. 
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Lynn and disinterring a body without lawful authority in Sharpe). Nearly 
twenty years later in R v Price (1884)28 Stephen J, referring to the facts in 
Lynn, said ‘the act done would have been a peculiarly indecent theft if it 
had not been for the technical reason that a dead body is not the subject of 
property.’29  
Lest we think that the need for creative rulings was a long distant 
problem, more contemporary cases illustrate otherwise; in particular, R v 
Kelly and Lindsay.30 In Kelly two men were convicted of the theft of various 
body parts (35-40 in total) from the Royal College of Surgeons. Lindsay, a 
technician at the College, had removed the body parts on behalf of Kelly, 
an artist who made casts from them.31 A crucial part of the men’s defence 
was that since body parts could not be property a prosecution pursuant to 
the Theft Act 1968 was not open to the court.32 This was rejected on the 
basis that the common law makes an exception to the ‘no property’ rule 
where work or skill has been applied to human materials.33 This originates 
from the ruling in the 1908 Australian case of Doodeward v Spence,34 and 
appears to have been accepted by the English court two years earlier in 
Dobson v North Tyneside Health Authority.35 In Kelly it was agreed that the 
body parts had been subject to a great amount of work and skill (that being 
required to prepare the prosections),36 and that the application of such 
rendered the body parts capable of being property.37 The work/skill 
exception was subsequently reaffirmed in AB and Others v Leeds Teaching 
Hospital NHS Trust.38 A key issue in these cases (historical and 
contemporary) is the fact that if the body and its parts were not capable of 
being property then prosecutions must proceed either on different bases 
(such as charges of indecency) or creative (and some might say dubious) 
ways sought to make them subject to property considerations.  
While the cases noted above involve theft-related acts, other recent 
cases demonstrate both the challenges that biotechnological developments 
present to the law as applied to human biomaterials and the utility that a 
property framework can offer.39 Of these, the case of Jonathan Yearworth 
and Others v. North Bristol NHS Trust40 is of particular note to scholars 
interested in the jurisprudence of property in human tissue. The case 
concerns the determination of liability for damage done to stored semen 
                                                 
28
 12 QBD 247. 
29
 Ibid. 252. 
30
 [1999] QB 621. 
31
 Kelly, n 22 above, 623. 
32
 Ibid. 622. 
33
 Ibid. 630-631. 
34
 6 CLR 406. 
35
 [1997] 1 W.L.R. 596. 
36
 Kelly, n 22 above, 624. 
37
 Ibid. 630. 
38
 [2004] EWHC 644 (QB). 
39
 See Yearworth (England), Bazley, Edwards, and Re H, AE (all Australia), n 22 above. 
40
 Yearworth, n 22 above. 
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samples.41 The samples had been stored by a licensed unit at Bristol 
Southmead Hospital42 because the men were about to undergo 
chemotherapy treatment and it was uncertain whether they would recover 
their fertility afterwards. The storage system failed and their samples 
perished. The question at issue was upon what basis, if any, a remedy was 
available for damage done. In this respect, the Court of Appeal heard 
arguments in personal injury, property, and bailment.43 The difficulty with 
considering such cases outside of a proprietary framework is evident when 
one of the other avenues explored in Yearworth is examined: personal 
injury. Counsel for the men argued that had the sperm been damaged due to 
injury of the scrotum this would have been a personal injury and, further, 
that the mere fact of ejaculation should not make a difference to such a 
determination.44 This is because the samples were being kept for use at a 
later date and the ‘intended function of the stored sperm was identical to its 
function when formerly inside the body, namely to fertilise a human egg’.45 
Lord Judge CJ, however, noted some anomalies that would arise from 
upholding a claim in personal injury, including (1) that a personal injury 
would still have arisen even if the sperm had been damaged after the men 
had recovered their natural fertility and (2) that destruction of the sperm 
after the statutory limit on storage had been reached would also have to be 
deemed an injury in this respect.46 In making this determination, the 
destruction of sperm was differentiated from unwanted pregnancy which is 
‘a physical event within the woman’s body’.47 In the eyes of the Court, 
damage cannot constitute a personal injury once the substance at issue is 
separated from the body; to do so ‘would generate paradoxes, and yield 
ramifications, productive of substantial uncertainty’.48 An alternative 
approach would be to reconceptualise the notion of ‘injury’ in such cases.49 
Rather than conceiving of the injury in physical terms, one might look 
instead to the specific interests that have been interfered with; for example, 
the loss of the chance to be a genetic parent.50 However, what is at issue is 
not simply the loss of such a chance. It is the loss of such a chance 
                                                 
41
 For detailed analyses of the case see M. Quigley, ‘Property: The Future of Human 
Tissue?’ (2009) 17 Med Law Rev 457; J. Lee, ‘The Fertile Imagination of the Common 
Law: Yearworth v North Bristol’ (2009) 17 TLJ 130;  S.H.E. Harmon and G.T. Laurie, 
‘Yearworth v. North Bristol NHS Trust: Property, Principles, Precedents, and Paradigms’ 
(2010) CLJ 69(3): 476–493, C. Hawes, ‘Property Interests in Body Parts: Yearworth v 
North Bristol NHS Trust’ (2010) 73 Modern law Review 119, and L. Skene, ‘Proprietary 
Interests in Human Bodily Material: Yearworth, Recent Australian Cases on Stored Semen 
and their Implications’ (2012) 20 Med Law Rev 227. 
42
 A licence was required under the provisions of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act 1990. 
43
 Yearworth, n 22 above, 18-50. 
44






 Ibid. 20. 
48
 Ibid. 23. 
49
 N. Priaulx, ‘Managing Novel Reproductive Injuries in the Law of Tort: The Curious 
Case of Destroyed Sperm’ (2010) 17 European J Health Law 81, 92. 
50
 Ibid. 
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consequent on damage to the means to make this happen. The courts do not, 
and ought not to, compensate for each and every instance where there is 
loss of a chance (like not finding a suitable reproductive partner). For this 
reason, it is the interests that a person has in the use and control of their 
(reproductive) biomaterials which are key and, which we will see in section 
three below, are captured by the core concept of property. 
Having rejected the personal injury argument in Yearworth, the Court 
held that the sperm could be considered as property for the purposes of the 
claims before them. Allowing that human biomaterials are capable of being 
property is not without precedent; however, the judgement in the case is 
notable for calling into question the work/skill exception as being the 
principal basis for the ascription of property rights in human tissue.51 Lord 
Judge CJ said ‘we are not content to see the common law in this area 
founded upon the principle in Doodeward, which was devised as an 
exception to a principle, itself of exceptional character, relating to the 
ownership of a human corpse. Such ancestry does not commend it as a solid 
foundation.’52 Instead of relying on this exception the Court, drawing on 
A.M Honoré’s conception of ownership (of which more will be said in the 
section 3.1 below), took the control that the plaintiffs had pursuant to the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 199053 as indicative of their 
property rights in the samples.54 Having accepted that the sperm could be 
considered as property it was then a short step to examine the facts in 
relation to the law of bailment.55 The Court of Appeal thus held that the 
men’s semen samples had been bailed to North Bristol NHS Trust and that 
the Trust was liable for the damage done. Hence the case represents the first 
time that the source of the tissue in question was explicitly recognised as 
being vested with property rights in their biomaterials. In the other cases 
noted above, where property was conceded, the work/skill exception was 
unfailingly used to confer the corresponding rights on third parties. 
Furthermore, although not relating to damaged samples, three recent 
Australian cases, Bazley v Wesley Monash IVF Pty Ltd,56 Jocelyn Edwards; 
Re the estate of the late Mark Edwards,57 and Re H, AE58 are also illustrative 
of the challenges presented to the law by the expanding uses of 
biomaterials. These cases involved applications by the wives of deceased 
men for the possession of their sperm samples. In the first of these, sperm 
samples from the deceased had been stored, prior to him undergoing 
chemotherapy for liver cancer, for the purpose of having children in the 
                                                 
51
 See Quigley, n 20 above, 665-666. 
52
 Yearworth, n 22 above, 45(d). 
53
 The case was decided before the amendments came into force, the amendments would 
not have had any material effect on the reasoning in Yearworth. 
54
 See Quigley, n 41 above, 462-463 and S Devaney, ‘Tissue Providers for Stem Cell 
Research: The Dispossessed’ (2010) 2 Law, Innovation, and Technology 165, 184. 
55
 Yearworth, n 22 above, 46-50. 
56
 Bazley, n 22 above. 
57
 Edwards, n 22 above. 
58
 Re H, AE (no. 2), n 22 above. 
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future.59 After her husband’s death the applicant requested that the hospital 
continue to store the sperm.60 In Edwards, the deceased and his wife had 
undergone tests for infertility and were due to attend the IVF clinic to 
discuss the results and the options.61 Before this could happen Mr Edwards 
was killed in an accident at work. Unlike in Bazley, a prior application had 
already been made and granted for the extraction and storage of sperm 
samples.62 The extant application was for the release of the samples to Mrs 
Edwards for the purposes of IVF treatment.63 Similarly, in Re H, AE the 
deceased died following an accident. There were no previously stored 
samples, but a previous order had been granted for the removal and storage 
of sperm samples.64 In Bazley, drawing on the decision in Yearworth, the 
samples were deemed to have been the property of the deceased so that the 
rights of possession passed to his personal representative after death.65 In 
the latter two cases, in determining that the samples were property the 
courts applied the work/skill exception. Further, the decisions noted that 
those who preserved the samples were acting as agents of the women. Thus, 
the property rights created vested in the applicants.66 If the sperm samples 
had not been considered as property it is difficult to imagine upon what 
grounds the courts could legitimately have given the women possession of 
them.  
Prior to having the technical ability to freeze and store semen for later 
use in IVF treatments, it was a moot point whether or not there were any 
legal remedies available for damage done or whether the samples could be 
considered as part of a person’s estate. The decisions in Yearworth, Bazley, 
and Edwards make it clear that when it comes to human tissue the ‘no 
property’ rule is outmoded67 and that the law of property can provide a 
framework for considering novel dilemmas.68 However, the challenges of 
advancing biotechnology are not limited to situations which have issues of 
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remedial action at their core. The value transformation that commercial and 
quasi-commercial activities gives rise to can lead to conflicts over the use 
(and abuse) of human biomaterials. Disputes involving commercial 
interests have not yet come before the English courts, but two cases from 
the United States are instructive in this respect; Moore v Regents of the 
University of California69 and Greenberg v Miami Children’s Hospital 
Research Institute.70 It is to these I now turn. 
 
 Biomaterials, control, & commercialisation 
In the first of these cases, actions were brought by John Moore against five 
defendants including Dr David Golde (his physician), Shirley Quan (a 
researcher), and the regents of the University of California, Los Angeles 
(UCLA). In 1976 Moore had been diagnosed with hairy cell leukaemia and 
had been referred for treatment to Dr Golde at the UCLA medical school. 
There he underwent an operation to remove his spleen. For the next seven 
years Moore returned regularly to see Golde. He believed that these visits 
were necessary for his on-going treatment and care, and during the visits 
numerous tissue samples taken, including bone marrow, sperm, and skin 
samples.71 Moore later discovered that a cell-line had been created from 
his splenic cells and that a patent had been issued with respect to the cell-
line and associated methods for producing cell products.72 Thirteen causes 
of action were alleged in the case, including an action in conversion.73 This 
can arise where goods have been converted to a person’s use in a manner 
which is ‘seriously inconsistent with the possession or right to immediate 
possession of another person.’74 Thus, the action requires that the claimant 
have legitimate proprietary rights (minimally consisting of a right of 
possession) regarding the object at issue. Moore claimed that ‘he continued 
to own his cells following their removal from his body, at least for the 
purpose of directing their use’.75 The California Superior Court considered 
that all thirteen causes of action hinged on whether or not there was a cause 
of action in conversion. It held that there was not. This was overturned by 
the Court of Appeal.76 Subsequently, the Californian Supreme Court 
reviewed the ruling and, in addition to the case in conversion, examined 
other causes of action in more detail. In particular it looked at possible 
causes for breach of fiduciary duty and lack of informed consent. 
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Giving the decision of the Court, Panelli J was not convinced that 
Moore retained an ownership interest in his cells.77 In coming to this 
conclusion the Court stated that a patient’s control over their excised tissue 
was so restricted by Californian statutory law that it ‘eliminates so many of 
the rights ordinarily attached to property that one cannot simply assume that 
what is left amounts to ‘property’ or ‘ownership’ for the purposes of 
conversion law.’78 The Court also rejected the action in conversion on 
policy grounds, claiming that to allow it would unduly ‘hinder research in 
the area by restricting access to the necessary raw materials.’79 Interestingly, 
despite the fact that the Court claimed that the law afforded Moore little 
continuing control over his excised cells,80 it stated that there was a cause of 
action for lack of informed consent or breach of fiduciary duty.81 The Court 
accepted that the plaintiff had not been told the material facts upon which to 
make his decision about treatment. The relevant information ought to have 
included the research and economic interests of his physicians.82 In allowing 
this, the Court is taking a contradictory stance. The reason for this, as I will 
argue in section 3.2 below, is that imposing a requirement of informed 
consent in relation to the subsequent uses of excised tissues bestows exactly 
the sort of potentially restrictive control which the court tried to avoid by 
denying that Moore had the requisite property rights. This is something that 
the majority decision did not seem to recognise; although Broussard J, 
dissenting, noted that ‘[i]f, as alleged in this case, plaintiff's doctor 
improperly interfered with plaintiff's right to control the use of a body part 
by wrongfully withholding material information from him before its 
removal, under traditional common law principles plaintiff may maintain a 
conversion action to recover the economic value of the right to control the 
use of his body part.’83 
The subsequent case of Greenberg relies on the decision in Moore for 
making a similar determination with respect to a claim in conversion. The 
plaintiffs in this later case included the Greenbergs and other families all of 
whom had children affected by Canavan disease. This is a degenerative 
disease of genetic origin which usually results in severe neurological 
symptoms and early childhood death. Having had an affected child, the 
Greenbergs wanted a way to identify carriers of the gene in order to 
facilitate pre-natal testing and so approached one of the defendants, Dr 
Matalon.84 They helped to locate other affected families, and along with 
them, provided not only tissue samples and their medical histories, but also 
financial support for the research.85 In contributing to the research effort the 
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plaintiffs claimed that they had done so on the understanding that it would 
be publicly available and that any consequent tests developed would be 
‘affordable and accessible’.86 They later discovered that a patent had been 
granted on the gene responsible for Canavan disease. The plaintiffs alleged 
that the Miami Children’s Hospital had also threatened to take action 
against other centres offering testing for Canavan disease. Further, the 
Miami Children’s Hospital was ‘negotiating exclusive licensing agreements 
and charging royalty fees’, the effect of which would have been to restrict 
access to the test.87 Three parts of the decision in this case are of particular 
note.  
First, the plaintiffs’ complaint of a lack of informed consent was 
dismissed by the Florida District Court.88 This was consequent on an 
unwillingness to ‘extend the duty of informed consent to cover economic 
interests’.89 This seems to stand in contradistinction to the position of the 
Court in Moore regarding informed consent. If, in line with Moore, 
disclosure of materials interests qua economic interests and future uses is 
relevant to the consent question, then it is unclear why it was not considered 
so in this case. One might argue that the decision in Moore regarding 
informed consent can be (justifiably) distinguished from that in Greenberg 
because Moore had not given his consent for any research uses of his tissue, 
whereas the plaintiffs in Greenberg explicitly gave their consent for such 
uses.90 Yet, even if this is the case, the Court in Greenberg did not fully 
engage with the important question of the legitimate limits on the use of the 
tissue samples, given the conditions under which they were donated; 
something which I will return to later. Secondly, an action in conversion 
was rejected. In making their case the plaintiffs alleged ‘a property interest 
in their body tissues and genetic information’.91 The crux of the matter for 
the Court was the fact that the tissue samples had been donated and so 
denied that samples given voluntarily could give rise to an action in 
conversion.92 In coming to this conclusion the Court seemed to accept that 
proprietary interests in the biomaterials were vested in the plaintiffs prior to 
donation. The focus is on rights after the removal of the tissue. Although 
Moore is cited as support in rejecting the claim, the Florida Court notes that 
it was ‘because the donor had no property interest at stake after the 
donation was made.93 The underlying reason for the decision is, in line with 
Moore, that allowing the plaintiffs’ claim in conversion ‘would cripple 
medical research as it would bestow a continuing right for donors to possess 
the results of any research conducted.’94 As we will see in section 3.2, this is 
a questionable claim. The third notable aspect of the decision in Greenberg 
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is that, despite dismissing the action in conversion, the plaintiffs’ claim of 
unjust enrichment was upheld.95 Unjust enrichment claims relate to gains 
(unjustly) made by third parties consequent on a particular causative 
event.96 The plaintiffs argued that they would not have given their 
biological samples if they had known of the intention to commercialise the 
results and tests that stemmed from the research. The Court acknowledged 
that the plaintiffs had, in this case, an ongoing ‘research collaboration [with 
the defendants] that involved [them] also investing time and significant 
resources in the race to isolate the Canavan gene.’97 For this reason, the 
defendants were found to have been ‘unjustly enriched by collecting license 
fees under the Patent.’98 This can be contrasted with the situation in Moore. 
Here splenic tissue and additional bodily materials were obtained, but other 
resources were not invested in the research effort by the plaintiff. While the 
tissue samples procured from the plaintiffs in Greenberg can be viewed as 
‘significant resources’, the aspects of the decision in relation to informed 
consent and conversion suggest that the Court did not see them in the same 
light as other kinds of resources. 
We can now see that two issues are central to both Moore and 
Greenberg; the interests of the parties in controlling the uses of the 
biomaterials and the commercial interests that flow from those uses.99 In 
these cases the balance of concern tips in favour of the researchers and their 
institutions (albeit to a slightly lesser degree in Greenberg). The concern 
regarding control, as articulated in Moore, is that property claims by 
individuals could hamper research and its potential benefits to society ‘by 
restricting access to the necessary raw materials.’100 As we have seen, this 
worry was also evident in Greenberg.101 In relation to commercial interests, 
the unease, expressed intemperately by Justice Arabian in Moore, was 
about the commercialisation of human biomaterials by the source. He says: 
Plaintiff has asked us to recognize and enforce a right to sell 
one's own body tissue for profit. He entreats us to regard the 
human vessel - the single most venerated and protected subject 
in any civilized society - as equal with the basest commercial 
commodity. He urges us to commingle the sacred with the 
profane. He asks much . . . The ramifications of recognizing 
and enforcing a property interest in body tissues are not known, 
but are greatly feared - the effect on human dignity of a 
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marketplace in human body parts, the impact on research and 
development of competitive bidding for such materials, and the 
exposure of researchers to potentially limitless and uncharted 
tort liability.102 
By denying that the plaintiffs in these cases had property in their 
biomaterials both of the central concerns are seemingly dealt with. 
However, there are (at least) three difficulties with the decisions here. First, 
the courts overplay the implications of granting proprietary control to the 
source of the tissue samples (and thus the impact of claims in conversion). 
Secondly, and something which is more apparent in Moore, there is an 
implicit acceptance that market transactions are germane to the property 
question; that is, a determination of property is seen as including rights to 
income or exchanges for value. An important example of this tendency, in 
England and Wales, is enshrined in the Human Tissue Act 2004. As 
mentioned earlier, the Act exempts human material from the prohibition on 
commercial dealings where it has become ‘the subject of property because 
of an application of skill’.103 Thus, for the purposes of the Act the right to 
engage in commercial dealings comes as part and parcel of a determination 
of property. Although this assumption is mirrored both in the popular 
consciousness104 and some of the academic literature,105 granting control to 
direct the use of human biomaterials is not the same as granting the right to 
derive income from their use; something which will become apparent 
throughout the rest of this article. The third issue arising is that there is an 
assumption that there is something morally suspect about the source 
engaging in commercial transactions with regards to biomaterials. I will 
return to matters as they relate to commercialisation in section four below, 
but first more closely examine the issue of control and its relationship to 
determinations of property and the issue of consent. 
 
Propertisation & the Control of Biomaterials 
Use, control, & property 
Property and property rights can be viewed as legal and political 
instruments serving the needs and expectations of society; as constructs that 
help us to conceptualise the way we should act towards the holders of 
property. The areas governed by property relations are diverse and can be 
multifaceted. They govern the use of most material things and of a wide 
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variety of intangibles.106 A common conception of property (at least 
amongst those writing on biomaterials) is as a complex bundle of rights; a 
bundle of normative relations which govern interactions between people 
regarding particular objects.107 Honoré provides a comprehensive account 
of the elements which could be said to make up this bundle,108 and sets out 
the rights, duties and other elements (e.g. powers, liabilities, immunities) 
which, when combined together, give an account of full liberal ownership; 
something which is defined as ‘the greatest possible interest in a thing 
which a mature system of law recognizes.’109 The elements of the bundle 
consist of rights to possess, use, manage, the income of the thing, the 
capital, security, transmissibility, and absence of term, as well as the 
prohibition on harmful use, liability to execution,110 and the incident of 
residuarity.111 On this account, none of the incidents are individually 
necessary or sufficient for ownership.112 Property as a bundle of these 
individual elements seemingly explains the diversity and complexity of 
property interests and relations. The elements can be traded and re-arranged 
to form different clusters of property rights or different types of ownership; 
for example, ownership, easements, leases, and bailments. Additionally, 
while each stick in the bundle is sometimes referred to as a property right, 
individual rights are not constitutive of ownership. Thus, the bundle 
metaphor also appears to help us to consider the differing legal positions of 
the holders of a variety of (clusters of) property rights; for example, owners, 
tenants, leases, bailors, and so on and so forth. However, if property is a 
flexible bundle of normative relations, and none of the incidents are 
individually necessary or sufficient for ownership, how are we to identify 
what ownership consists of? Similarly, how are we to distinguish ownership 
from lesser proprietary rights and interests? I do not propose to 
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comprehensively answer these questions here, but raise them to indicate 
that the conception of property as a flexible bundle is not unproblematic.113  
Honoré’s own account indicates certain incidents (or clusters of 
incidents) are more central than others to the idea of full ownership. For 
example, in ‘Ownership’ he says that ‘[n]o doubt the concentration in the 
same person of the right (liberty) of using as one wishes, the right to 
exclude others, the power of alienating and an immunity from expropriation 
is a cardinal feature of the institution.’114 Elsewhere he comments that ‘if the 
leading incidents of ownership – benefit, management, and title – are united 
in the same person, that person is in reality the owner of the thing’.115 While 
his analysis could be taken as giving us a particular liberal conception of 
ownership, his incidents are best viewed, as described himself, ‘as a 
working institution’.116 His account, as highlighted by the late J.W. Harris, 
describes components generally found in property institutions rather than 
the analytic core of property.117 For this reason, Harris argued for the 
analytic separation of some elements, and separated out what he saw as the 
core of property and ownership (use-privileges and control-powers) from 
other adjunctive rules generally contained within systems of property 
(trespassory, property-limitation, expropriation, and appropriation rules).118 
He maintained that ‘[p]rivileges and powers are intrinsic elements of 
ownership interests. Claim-rights, duties, liabilities, and immunities are 
important concomitants of ownership interests but are not analytically 
intrinsic to ownership interests in resources (material or ideational).’119 The 
adjunctive rules mark out the scope and boundaries of a person’s property 
interests by variously supporting, protecting, or altering those interests. 
Core property rights, encompassing use and control (termed ‘control rights’ 
by commentators such as John Christman120), can be justified on either an 
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instrumental or an expressive theory of property. As Jesse Wall notes, this 
is because they can be thought of as bringing about some desirable future 
state of affairs (instrumental justification) or because they are important for 
‘a person’s preference satisfaction, their autonomous life or the expression 
of their personhood’ (expressive justification).121 Harris conceptualises 
clusters of these privileges and powers as lying along a spectrum where 
they range from ‘mere property’ at the bottom to ‘full-blooded ownership’ 
at the top.122 Full-blooded ownership occurs where the owner has ‘prima 
facie, unlimited privileges of use or abuse over the thing, and, prima facie, 
unlimited powers of control or transmission, so far as such use or exercise 
of power does not infringe some property-independent prohibition.’123 By 
contrast, while mere property entails some privileges to use and powers to 
control those uses, it does not necessitate the power to transfer those powers 
and privileges to another.124 
In setting out this view of property I am mindful of two related issues. 
First, it could be noted that the common law protects rights of non-
interference and not a person’s rights to use a particular thing. Secondly, for 
some, the distinctiveness of property is characterised, not by open-ended set 
of liberties and powers regarding particular items, but by a right to exclude 
which is operational against the rest of the world.125 If I own a particular 
item, you (and everyone else) are under a prima facie duty not to interfere 
with my use of it. Use in this sense does not just refer to those junctures 
where I may want to actively engage in its use, but to any and all occasions 
of interference. For example, if I am away on holiday and you take my 
book without my permission, you have not interfered with my current use 
of the book (since I am not around to physically use the book). 
Nevertheless, you have breached your legal duty of non-interference. While 
this is not technically the same as having a legally protected right to use 
things, the effect is to protect the liberty/privilege to do so. It also protects 
the control that owners have over the uses of their items of property, 
including the power to exclude (or not) others from their enjoyment. Thus, 
the characterisation set out earlier reflects a (legal) philosophical conception 
of property (and ownership): use and control are the defining features (it is 
these use-privileges and control-powers I refer to when I use the term 
property rights). What is at issue when we engage in property discourse are 
these rights; that is, people’s interests in using and controlling the uses and 
abuses of particular objects or resources; the full-blooded owner is ‘entirely 
free [subject to property-independent prohibitions] to do what he will with 
his own, whether by use, abuse, or transfer.’126 In this manner, the power to 
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alienate one’s property, that is, divest oneself in toto all of one’s rights with 
respect to a particular object, represents the ultimate disposition of those 
rights. Arguably this necessarily encompasses gifting, and as such donation, 
as an exercise of a person’s power to transfer. Yet the alienability of one’s 
property (rights) by transfer need not include market alienability.127 As we 
will see later in this article, powers of transmission need not, and do not, 
imply that there is a right to derive income from such transfers.  
 
Property, consent, & restricting research 
When conflicts over human biomaterials arise, determining who has 
property rights in or ownership of these is important. Such a determination 
is not a trivial matter because in allowing that certain parties can have 
property rights in and ownership of biomaterials, we are granting that they 
have control over those biomaterials. Additionally, in permitting ownership 
we are also determining who does not have rights of use and control over 
the body and its parts. Recall that a motivating factor in the decisions in 
Moore and Greenberg was a concern about continuing control. This was 
related to a disquiet regarding the potential effects on research of granting 
proprietary control of the biomaterials to their source. In both of these cases 
the claims in conversion were dismissed. As we saw earlier, in Moore it 
was denied that the plaintiff had any property rights in the biomaterials,128 
while in Greenberg the Court saw the source’s interests with regards to 
their biomaterials as ceasing (or being strictly limited) after procurement 
has taken place, maintaining that any (property) rights had been 
extinguished since the tissue samples were voluntarily donated for 
research.129 In this respect the reasoning in the latter case more accurately 
reflects the operation of the law of property. A determination of property 
does not confer (in and of itself) the right to continue to direct or restrict the 
uses of biomaterials once legitimately transferred. Ordinarily, my control 
over an item qua property will cease upon transfer. This is no different from 
other sorts of moveables.130 Thus, recognising that the source has certain 
property rights over their separated materials need not ‘cripple’ medical 
research as the Court in Moore envisaged. Conversely, as we also saw, the a 
cause of action based in informed consent was sustained. This is significant 
because it has bearing on both the concern about restricting research and on 
the legitimacy of any transfers of the biomaterials in question.  
In relation to the first of these, the finding regarding informed consent 
is inconsistent with the Court’s approach regarding property. If the worry is 
                                                                                                                                                   
use-privileges and powers; that is, property-independent prohibitions. I cannot, for 
example, set my semi-detached house alight or stick my knife in your chest, the reasons for 
which (moral or legal) have nothing to do with the fact that I might own either the house or 
the knife.  
127
 See David Price’s comments in relation to the Human Tissue Act 2004: D. Price, ‘The 
Human Tissue Act 2004’ in Modern Law Review (2005) 68(5):798-821, 818. 
128
 Moore, n 69 above, 137. 
129
 Greenberg, n 70 above, 1074-5. 
130
 Thank you to one of the anonymous reviewers for helping to clarify my thoughts here. 
Quigley, M. ‘Propertisation and Commercialisation: On Controlling the 
Uses of Human Biomaterials’ (2014) 77(5) MLR 677–702 
19 
about the potential for restricting research using biomaterials, then we 
ought to be at least as, if not more, worried about consent for donations as 
we are about property. The reason for this is because, in requiring that 
consent be obtained, individuals are granted, at the point of donation, 
ultimate control over the disposition of their tissues, cells, and other 
products.131 Individuals can simply decide not to donate their biomaterials at 
all, thus potentially hampering the very research effort that the Court was 
concerned about. This was partially recognised in Greenberg since, as we 
have already seen, in relation economic interests the Court declined to 
uphold an action in informed consent, stating that to do so ‘would chill 
medical research’132 and ‘give rise to a type of dead-hand control [by] 
research subjects’.133 This, however, is also unsatisfactory. The Court in this 
case did not make any concrete statements regarding informed consent in 
general. It merely came to the conclusion that Florida jurisprudence did not 
offer any ‘clear guidance’134 and proceeded to examine the issue specifically 
in respect of economic interests. The problem with this is that whether or 
not individuals agree to give their biomaterials for research may well 
depend on the uses to which they will be put, including uses for economic 
benefit. Thus, where individuals object to the use of their biomaterials for 
commercial purposes they may be deterred from giving them at all. 
Furthermore, although the Court in Moore made much of the potential 
restrictive effect of granting individuals property rights in their 
biomaterials, they were willing to grant them to researchers and research 
institutions, thereby allowing them to restrict access to both the raw 
materials and the results of the research. Indeed, the restriction of the latter 
was exactly the issue for the plaintiffs in Greenberg, who wanted to ensure 
the public availability and affordability of any tests developed for Canavan 
disease.  
Although one of the things at issue in Greenberg was the fact that, at 
the time, there was little legal guidance on the matter under Florida state 
law, this is not the case in England and Wales. Under the Human Tissue 
Act 2004 it is clear that appropriate consent is required for all scheduled 
purposes. This includes the removal, storage, and use of materials from the 
deceased, and the storage and use of materials from the living.135 The 
common law governs the removal of samples from the living, wherein 
individuals are protected by the law of battery and assault and, as such, 
consent is also the benchmark. While there are some exemptions contained 
within the 2004 Act,136 the general principle of requiring appropriate 
consent is clear. The Human Tissue Authority’s Code of Practice (CoP) on 
consent links appropriate consent to the notion of validity and says that, in 
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order to be valid, the consent must be voluntary, informed, and given by 
someone with capacity.137 Although there is no real definition of consent 
given in the CoP,138 this broadly coheres with philosophical accounts of the 
some of the requirements for consent to be valid.139 One implication of this 
is that certain occurrences will have a bearing on the potential validity of 
the consent given. In particular, the initial conditions under which the 
donations are made will and indeed ought to be important. These will 
impact on the legitimacy of the initial transfer of materials and, thus, on the 
lawfulness of their subsequent uses. This would seem to be the case 
whether or not we conceive of the materials as originally being the property 
of the source. If we think about donated samples free-floating from any 
notion of property, then the transfers done without appropriate consent will 
fall foul of the requirements of the 2004 Act. For example, if the materials 
are being collected for research purposes, the particulars of the research and 
the potential uses will need to be explained to the donor, including the 
possibility of commercialisation. However, obtaining consent only for 
circumscribed research projects can be restrictive since the materials cannot 
be used for other purposes afterwards. This is recognised by the HTA 
which recommends that, where possible, generic consent be sought.140 If an 
important aspect of valid consent is that it must be informed, then this 
creates a problem for the very idea of generic consent, which by its nature 
does not specify all the potential uses for samples obtained. It might be the 
case that informing donors that there are unknown, and currently 
unknowable, future uses of these materials is enough. Yet whether or not 
this is correct is largely immaterial to those situations where we do know 
about potential uses.  
Likewise, if we see the samples as property, the legitimacy of the 
transfer is called into question where it is not consensual or where the 
original consent is vitiated; for example, transfers involving deception, 
fraud, or coercion. Property in chattels can be transferred by deed, delivery, 
or sale.141 There must also be an intention to transfer.142 Within the current 
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system, transfer by delivery would be the most significant mode of transfer 
relevant to the procurement of biomaterials for research. Individuals 
express their intention to transfer the samples via their consent to donation 
and these samples are taken into the possession of the researchers or their 
institution. Physical possession of the samples along with the attendant 
property rights are thus transferred. Problems will not generally arise with 
the actual delivery aspect of the transaction; however, depending on how 
the consenting and procurement process is handled, the transfer may be 
voidable.143 If there is a fraudulent misrepresentation of the purposes for 
which the biomaterials will be used then the transfer of the property rights 
can be rescinded.144 We can see why this might be pertinent to cases such as 
Greenberg. As we have already seen the plaintiffs in this case only 
consented to the donation of the samples on the understanding that the 
results of the research would not be restricted or commercialised. If a 
similar case were to come before the English courts and the source was 
deemed originally to have property rights in the samples, then they need not 
reach the conclusion that an individual’s rights terminate upon donation. 
Such a conclusion would depend on whether or not there had been a 
legitimate transfer of the biomaterials in the first place; a claim which might 
not be sustainable where donors are misled or inadequately informed about 
potential uses of their samples. In Moore it was claimed that ‘companies are 
unlikely to invest heavily in developing, manufacturing, or marketing a 
product when uncertainty about clear title exists.’145 Despite this 
pronouncement, finding in favour of the plaintiff would not have resulted in 
any uncertainty, quite the contrary. The message from the Court would 
have been clear: title vests in the source and it is not acceptable for 
researchers, their institutions, or biotech companies to illegitimately convert 
their biomaterials to their own use. Further, if they do, there would be a 
penalty for so doing. It is not necessarily the case that this would unduly 
hamper medical research. Instead, recognising the initial proprietorial 
control of the source would simply ensure that any transfer of biomaterials 
(and the accompanying property rights) is done in a legitimate manner; that 
is, with proper consent.  
 
Commercialisation & commodification: Lines in the sand? 
Objections to property in biomaterials are infrequently objections to 
transfer per se, but instead to the possibility of the sale of those materials. 
Further, as we saw in relation to Justice Arabian’s comments in Moore,146 
objections to the sale of biomaterials tend not to be blanket objections to 
such a practice, but to the possibility that the source of the biomaterials 
could engage in market transactions with respect to their tissues and cells. 
There are two aspects to this which warrant further scrutiny. The first is the 
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relationship between property and market transactions and the second, is 
the (misplaced) worry regarding the sphere of activity of the source in 
relation to their biomaterials.147  
Let us presume for the time being that we agree with the thrust of the 
objection in Moore; that, for whatever reason, it is morally unsavoury to 
permit individuals to sell their own biomaterials. If we accept property as 
including the right to income, we might be tempted to deny that individuals 
can have property in their separated tissue in order to guard against the 
possibility of sale. This was the approach in Moore: recall that the Supreme 
Court ruled that the plaintiff’s tissues were not his property (although, as 
we have already seen, here it was also the case that the Court wanted to 
deny the plaintiff the control over the tissue that property endows). Denying 
that there is property (for the source) in human biomaterials would also be 
the favoured approach of some commentators. For example, Sean Cordell 
and colleagues maintain that decisions, such as the one in Yearworth, when 
given in terms of property and ownership ‘can encourage us to think of 
parts of people as things to be exchanged, sold and used all with the 
accompanying market rhetoric.’148 One response to this line of reasoning is 
to note that property rights have never been unfettered. There are 
limitations on the use of the objects of property even on more traditional 
conceptions. For this reason, one might allow that a person can have 
property rights in their biomaterials, but deny that the right to income is one 
of the sticks in their property bundle. An example of this can be seen in the 
way that Stephen Munzer addresses the issue. He allows that some of the 
rights we have with respect to our bodies and their parts can be property 
rights and subdivides them into weak and strong property rights. The 
former protects gratuitous (free) transfers and the latter transfers for 
value;149 the donation of a kidney for transplantation would be an example 
of gratuitous transfer, while, at least in the context of the United States, the 
sale of blood and semen would represent transfers for value.150 
Contrariwise, in the United Kingdom the sale of blood and semen does not 
take place; therefore, any proprietary rights, from the perspective of the 
source, would be construed as weak rights.151 Conceiving of things in this 
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manner accepts that gratuitous transfers (gifts) are properly part of the law 
of property. This is appropriate not only from the position of the common 
law of property, which encompasses the law of gifts,152 but also 
philosophically. If, as outlined earlier, a key part of the core of property is 
powers of control and transmission, then this will include the power to 
make gratuitous transfers. However, while gifting involves the exercise of 
property rights, there is more to the story when it comes to sales.  
According to Munzer, ‘[s]upport [for this weak/strong distinction] lies 
in the thought that property is pre-eminently something that can be bought 
and sold in a market.’153 We can see why he says this; it can be difficult to 
disentangle property from market transactions. As Harris noted ‘bargaining 
and contracting in most situations take property for granted’.154 
Furthermore, ‘[i]n modern legal systems, the majority of contracts 
presuppose property. The contractor on one side at least offers to transmit 
something over which he has ownership privileges and powers, especially 
money.’155 Yet it does not follow from the general marriage of property and 
contract that the right to make either legally or morally binding agreements 
is part of the core of property. This is both an analytical legal claim and a 
normative philosophical one. Regarding the first of these, although some 
kind of property is a pre-requisite for many contracts, as Penner observes, 
having property does not necessarily entail the right to trade or enter into 
contractual agreements with other individuals or organisations.156 
Transactions of this sort involve two separate (and separable) areas of law: 
property and contract. Hence, he usefully describes the right to sell as a 
‘hybrid ‘power’ in which the power to make contracts includes the power to 
make contracts concerning the power to dispose of property.’157 We can see 
why this ought to be the case by looking at the normative arguments 
regarding the justifications for property rights and income rights.  
Crucially, the underlying justification for the right to receive income 
is different from that underpinning the recognition of property rights. The 
right to income is, according to Christman, ‘composed of two separate 
rights . . . the right to transfer and the right to retain goods received in 
trade’.158 There are two main reasons why this is the case.159 First, 
transactions which result in the accrual of value are both dependent on, and 
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the cause of, the pattern of resource distribution in society. When an owner 
engages in market exchanges or trades, the income that accrues to him is 
dependent on the distribution of resources in the economy at that particular 
time. Yet, it is also the case that this exchange plays a part in determining 
the subsequent downstream distribution of resources.160 This ‘dual-causal 
connection’161 is illustrated by Wall who gives the example of kidneys and 
blood: 
[I]f kidneys and blood were both tradable commodities, the 
income received for the sale of a kidney would be higher than 
for the equivalent amount of blood because of the scarcity of 
the resource and the willingness of purchasers to pay for the 
organ . . . The recognition of income rights in kidneys would 
lead to a different (for better or worse) allocation of kidneys in 
society since they could be freely exchanged as a 
commodity.162 
The second reason why income rights should be conceived as distinct 
from property rights is also linked to considerations of distribution and is 
related to the benefits that society derives from permitting trades. 
According to Christman, income rights are consequent on the very 
existence of a market and the market creates surpluses which are a net 
benefit to society; it does this through ‘efficiencies of stability, information 
transfer, and economies of scale’.163 If this is correct, then these extra 
benefits exist because of the system as a whole rather than individual 
property-holders; in which case no one individual can be said to have a 
prior claim to control the surplus. In such a situation, society, perhaps 
through the state, can decide to redistribute any surpluses and, thereby, 
determine the income rights to be recognised.164 Thus, income rights are tied 
to considerations of distributive justice in a manner that rights of use and 
control are not.165 This is not to claim that control rights do not have any 
distributive implications. The extent to which owners are permitted to 
accumulate income consequent on the use and control of their property, 
they become, as Harris put it, agents of wealth-distribution.166 However, this 
dual function of governing the use of things and allocating items of social 
wealth does not detract from the fact that these functions are separable and 
rest on different justifications.  
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In addition to resting on different justificatory bases, the manner in 
which property (control) rights generally operate can be substantially 
distinguished from the way income rights function. There is some overlap, 
but, as Christman puts it, the latter are conditional or contingent on other 
persons for their exercise in a way in which control rights need not be.167 In 
order for a person to engage in exchanges or trades for value, someone else 
must also engage in the transaction. An owner can neither transfer her 
property for value nor accrue any net benefit or income from this if no-one 
is willing to trade with her. No-one has a duty to engage in market 
transactions for the benefit of another.168 As such, no right to income can be 
enjoyed in isolation from others. By contrast there are many use-privileges 
and control-powers that can be exercised over a resource that are not 
dependent on others for that use and control. Consider, for example, a book. 
One can read it, refrain from reading it, burn it, use it to prop up a table, 
etc.; engagement with others in the market or elsewhere is not necessary in 
order to exercise such use and control. One could contend that this element 
of contingency is not just relevant to transfers for value, but to all transfers 
and, hence to instances of gifting and donation.169 This strikes me as broadly 
accurate at a one-to-one interpersonal level, however, exchanges within a 
market seem crucially different from gratuitous transfers (or even simple 
exchanges). The ‘level of contingency’ involved in market transactions is 
greater than these other types of transaction.170 As noted earlier, it is the 
very existence of markets which creates surplus value and, therefore, 
income rights. A market system is “contingent on the existence of stable 
rules of cooperation which govern the exchanges in question.”171 This 
requires that our relations with others to be organised on a scale that is not 
necessary for simpler transactions. Of course, we can, and often do, conduct 
market transactions between only two actors. However, even in situations 
where I sell you my pen in a direct transaction we are dependent on the 
existence of the market at large, something which is not the case if I just 
give the pen to you. The market will influence, and perhaps set, the price at 
which I sell you the item in question. Furthermore, our tokens of exchange 
(money) are only available to us because of the market. Thus, as well as 
having different underlying justifications, there is seemingly an operational 
gap between the property rights and any income rights arising from their 
transfer. In relation to biomaterials, when income rights are seen as separate 
from the core use-privileges and control-powers which might govern them, 
we avoid conflating the power to transfer with any right to accrue value 
from that transfer.  
Separating the powers of control from the right to income as just 
outlined allows us to admit property, without necessarily having to permit 
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biomaterials to be traded on the market (tout court). However, there is, as 
we saw earlier, a flourishing global market in tissues, cells, and other 
biomaterials.172 Despite this, there is sometimes selective moral disquiet 
about the effect of the commercialisation of human biomaterials by their 
source. Concerns of this ilk imply that permitting individuals a portion of 
the income rights for their tissues is to wrongfully commodify those tissues 
or the individuals themselves.173 The conceptual terrain with regards to 
commodification claims is complex. There are a multitude of interrelated 
concepts at play and commentators focus on differing and diverging aspects 
of these in their attempt to bring some clarity to the issue.174 There is not 
space here for a thorough-going analysis of all of the varied aspects of the 
debate, but one worry which seems to cut across a number of enquires175 is 
that treating as things that which ought not to be treated as such or which 
are something else.176 Expressions of concern of this type convey a 
conceptual divide between subject (person) and object (thing), something 
which can be seen in writing on property and the body.177 For those who 
would support such a division, caution needs to be exercised when it comes 
to considering commodification. We ought not to elide moral concerns 
about our treatment of separated biomaterials with those regarding our 
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treatment of persons. When we speak of separated biomaterials we cannot 
think that those items are wrongly commodified in and of themselves; that 
they are not capable of being objects or things in the relevant sense. Third 
parties can, and do acquire these materials, whereupon they are treated as 
things and are subsumed into the market. They are, thus, commodified. 
Even so, the commodification of biomaterials does not necessarily imply 
commodification of the person.  
If arguments from commodification are to have any bite then the 
relevant moral objection must centre on cases where the person from whom 
the particular biomaterial has originated is somehow wrongfully 
commodified. As Wilkinson observes ‘one of the main ways in which we 
fail to treat (autonomous, competent) people as ends is by doing things to 
them (or that involve them) without requiring their valid consent’.178 We 
can see why this would be the case. Consent is a means of respecting the 
autonomy of persons. If this is done in a substantive sense, we do not use 
persons as mere means since we are acting in line with their autonomous 
goals and interests. The implication of this is that we wrongfully 
commodify persons, and treat them as a mere means, where we permit third 
parties to non-consensually acquire either use or income rights (or both) in 
biomaterials, while denying them to the source of those materials. We 
cannot coherently worry about the commodifying effect of recognising 
property and income rights in the source, while protecting those self-same 
rights in third parties. 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
Permitting property rights to be exercised with regards to biomaterials 
recognises a particular way of controlling their use. Further, it brings them 
within the purview and protection of existing property institutions; thus 
providing a framework for allowing remedies for wrongs done (e.g. 
Yearworth). Protections and remedies are important given the value 
transformation in those materials which has occurred with biotechnological 
advances and innovations. Treating these materials within an existing 
framework makes them subject to a variety of legal rules which function to 
protect, curtail, or alter the requisite proprietary interests. Yet the 
propertisation of human biomaterials need not entail their 
commercialisation. A person’s powers of transmission (as part of their use-
privileges and control-powers) with regards to particular objects ought to be 
seen as different to, and separate from, their income rights in this respect. 
The reason for this is because the recognition of each rests on different 
justifications. As such, full ownership does not analytically demand the 
right to contract to the transfer of property in exchange for income or some 
other value in kind. If we are to oppose commercial activities relating to 
human biomaterials, it ought not to be on the basis that they are not the 
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appropriate objects of property. We already engage in activities, such as 
tissue donation, which arguably rely on them being such. Nevertheless, if 
we do not want to allow those income rights to also attach to the source in 
this respect, we need to question why they ought to be permitted to attach to 
third parties (e.g. researchers and biotech companies). The effect of the 
Human Tissue Act 2004 is that third parties can acquire the right to sell 
human biomaterials. Additionally, where the courts decline to protect the 
economic interests that individuals might have in their biomaterials, such as 
in Moore and Greenberg, they strengthen the protection of those same 
interests held by researchers and their institutions. If, per Justice Arabian’s 
words in Moore, we ought not to use the human vessel as a base 
commercial commodity, then should this prohibition not also extend to 
third parties? For those who are tempted to respond in the negative to this 
suggestion, there remains the challenge of adequately explaining why 
permitting income rights is wrongful commercialisation (and/or 
commodification) in one instance, but not in the other.  
 
 
 
 
